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Resounding vidory for 
democracy in Aceh 
The local elections in Aceh on 11 
December 2006 resulted in convincing 
victories for independent candidates. 
lrwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar 
secured the positions of governor and 
vice-governor while other key posts, such 
as district heads (bupati) in North and East 
Aceh and mayors of the cities of Lhok -
Seumawe and Sabang, were also won by 
independents. The Acehnese voted for a 
dramatic change in the political landscape. 
Under Indonesian law, there is no place for independent 
candidates in elections but the recently adopted LOGA 
(Law on the Governance of Aceh) made provision for such 
an option. As a result, independent candidates who 
obtained the necessary initial number of supporters were 
able to stand and they gained considerable support from 
the electorate. It is understood that LOGA will be 
amended to enable local parties to contest future 
elections. This is a precedent that is bound to reverberate 
in other parts of Indonesia. 
As things stand, political parties in Indonesia need to 
have branches in at least half of the provinces to be able 
to compete in elections. This restricts elections to national 
parties and blocks the way for local parties. 
No second round needed 
The governorship in Aceh was a much coveted position, 
especially since the tsunami when there has been a strong 
emphasis on reconstruction and reconciliation . All the 
larger national parties such as GOLKAR, PPP, PAN, PBB, 
PDl-P, PBR and PKS fielded candidates. The candidates 
were nominated in pairs for each of the top positions 
being contested. Several of the pairs were independents 
while one pair was a combination of a party 
representative and an independent. 
The official result, announced on 2 January, was that 
lrwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar had won with 
768,745 votes or 38.20 per cent of the 2,012.370 votes 
cast. They will be sworn in on 8 February. They scored 
very well in sixteen of the 21 sub-districts and cities. The 
runners up with 16.62 per cent of the votes were Humam 
Hamid and Hasbi Abdullah, a combination of the PPP and 
an independent. GOLKAR, which is the largest party in 
Indonesia, fielded Malik Raden and Sayed Fuad who came 
third with only 13.97 per cent of the votes. Two generals, 
both former commanders in Aceh, performed woefully. 
Retired generals Tamlicha Ali and Harmen Nuriqmar won 
only 3.99 per cent while retired generals Djali Yusuf and 
Syauqas Rahmatillah got even less at 3.26 per cent, 
placing them at the bottom the pile . Another independent 
couple, Ghazali and Salahuddin al Fata, achieved a 
respectable 7.80 per cent, despite a lack of funds and with 
no electoral machine to help them. Ghazali Abbas, a 
former outspoken MP in Jakarta still has quite a lot of 
support in Acehnese civil society who remember him as 
the only parliamentarian to speak out against military 
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ACEH 
brutq.lity during the worst periods of 
the conflict in Aceh. 
The opinion polls and predictions 
by some experts and Aceh watchers 
were way off the mark. The Humam 
Hamid-Hasbi Abdullah team were 
seen by many as the favourites 
while the combination of Azwar 
Abubakar, former governor of Aceh, 
and Nasir Djamil, a young national 
MP from the PKS, were also seen as 
potential winners. But the results 
revealed that the electorate voted 
for radical change while striking a 
heavy blow against the national 
parties based in Jakarta. 
According to the election law, if 
no pair obtained 25 per cent of the 
votes, a second round would have 
been needed. With such a strong 
field of candidates, most observers 
predicted that no one would reach 
the threshold and a second round 
would take place in February. But 
this proved to be wrong, with the 
lrwandi-Nazar team substantially 
exceeding the 25 per cent threshold, Voting in the december elections. Photo - Tapol 
with more than double the votes of 
the runners up. The winners won not only in GAM 
strongholds but also elsewhere, in areas often seen as 
being either neutral or with weak support for GAM. 
Of the 21 districts and cities, only five went to non-
independent candidates. Due to the complicated 
demography of Aceh over the last few years, many 
thousands had left Aceh during the years of conflict but 
returned home after the peace process. Many survivors of 
the tsunami disaster had lost their personal documents 
and could not register in time to vote . Of the 2.6 million 
eligible voters, only 2, 166,033 cast their votes. 
Free and democratic elections 
The elections took place without any major disturbances. 
Monitoring teams from many parts of the world 
confirmed that the election was 
advocated the holding of a referendum on the political 
future of Aceh in the late nineties. 
lrwandi, the elected governor, has a colourful 
background . He joined GAM only eight years ago, in 
1998, after returning from the US where he studied 
veterinary science. He became GAM liaison officer in 
Jakarta and was arrested in 2003 and given a nine-year 
· jail sentence. He escaped from Keudah Prison during the 
tsunami on 26 December 2004 and was a member of the 
GAM delegation at the Helsinki peace talks. After the 
MoU was signed in August 2005, he became the GAM 
representative in AMM, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the 
body responsible for implementation of the MoU. 
Initially lrwandi did not intend to stand for the 
governorship but developments in GAM compelled him to 
orderly and peaceful. Observers from a precedent that is 
the European Parliament described 
the elections as a victory for parts of Indonesia. 
bound to reverberate in other 
democracy in Indonesia. The only 
major flaw was the many unregistered voters, but their 
protests were directed through the proper channels and 
there were no demonstrations or unrest. 
Bearing in mind that three years ago, lrwandi and 
Nazar were both in jail as political prisoners and military 
operations against GAM were in full swing, the elections 
signal a huge change in Aceh . 
Since the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2005, Jakarta has abandoned the 
security approach and has accepted GAM as a partner in 
the peace process. As a result, GAM members and 
supporters are at last enjoying the same basic rights as 
other citizens in Aceh. 
The independent candidates 
Most of the independent candidates projected clear 
political programmes, in particular members of GAM and 
SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Centre), which had 
do so. The old GAM leadership, including those living in 
exile in Sweden, expressed support for the duo Humam 
Hamid, an Acehnese intellectual with a good track record, 
and Hasbi Abdullah, a former political prisoner, a well-
known GAM activist. They have become known as the 
H20 duo. Since the peace process, all GAM ex-
combatants have been organised in a non-military 
structure known as KPA (Komisi Peralihan Aceh or Aceh 
Transitional Commission). The highest structure within 
GAM is the majelis, which is a kind of parliament. Some 
key members of the ma;elis promoted the H20 duo, but 
this combination was rejected by the GAM rank-and-file, 
organised within the KPA. 
After a brief period of uncertainty, the lrwandi-Nazar 
duo emerged as the choice of the rank and file . Despite 
the initial support by the GAM leadership for H20, the 
rank-and-file support secured victory for lrwandi and his 
running mate. 
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direction . It also means that money 
politics, a common feature in 
Jakarta, has been rejected. The 
independent candidates campaigned 
on shoestring budgets while their 
supporters assembled 
spontaneously, by contrast with the 
traditional mobilisation of large 
crowds by nationail parties, 
transporting large numbers of 
people to their rallies on hired buses 
and trucks. The independent 
candidates also lacked the funds to 
produce leaflets and banners. As it 
turned out, the Aceh electorate was 
not impressed by the many banners 
held aloft on behalf of the national 
party candidates. 
the electorate voted for radi<?al change, striking a 
heavy blow against the Jakarta-based national 
The Acehnese electorate has 
shown a defiance of Jakarta politics 
since the early seventies. While the 
entire country was arm-twisted into 
accepting GOLKAR, the ruling party, 
the Acehnese stubbornly turned 
away from GOLKAR and opted for 
the PPP, a Muslim party federation 
parties 
Muhammad Nazar was the chair of SIRA, the Aceh 
Referendum Information Centre, from 1998. In 1999 he 
was arrested after organising a huge mass rally in 
November 1999. He was released in 2002 but soon 
afterwards, martial law was re-introduced and Nazar 
landed in jail again after being sentenced to eight years 
imprisonment. As a result of the signing of the MoU, he 
was released on 31 August 2005. 
The relationship between GAM and SIRA is quite 
complex. On the one hand it could be said that SIRA has 
functioned as the peaceful political wing of GAM but but 
on the other hand it has often operated rather 
independently of GAM. Key players in SIRA were student 
activists and their top leaders are still in their early thirties. 
The other independent candidates 
and one of the three parties allowed 
to function under Suharto 
It took more than 20 years for the Suharto regime to 
push GOLKAR down the throats of the Acehnese. It was 
not until the last Suharto-era elections in the nineties, 
when DOM (military operations) were in full swing, that 
the Acehnese grudgingly accepted the dominance of 
GOLKAR, helped along by huge injections of money. 
However, in the post-Suharto period, when political 
freedoms were granted, the Acehnese quickly abandoned 
their GOLKAR allegiance. While the trend in most parts of 
Indonesia was to vote primarily for the two secular parties, 
GOLKAR and the PDl-P, the Acehnese defied this trend 
and lent their support to a wide variety of Muslim political 
parties and to GOLKAR. 
have a similar background. Munawar • • 
uza, formerly the GAM a victory for democracy 1n Indonesia... money 
representative in the US, together • • 
with lslamuddin, a SIRA activist, won pohtlCS have been defeated 
the election for mayor in the harbour 
city of Sabang. The same occurred in 
the second biggest city, Lhok Seumawe, where two well-
known GAM activists, Munir Usman and Suaidi Yahya, 
were easily elected. In other places such as Aceh Timur, 
two independent pairs were fielded: Muslim Abdullah, a 
local GAM activist, and Nasruddin, a SIRA activist won the 
seats of district and vice district chiefs. In the Aceh Raya 
district, the independent candidates Azhar Abdurrachman 
and Zamzami A. Rani were elected. In the GAM 
strongholds of Pidie and Aceh Utara the pairs of Mirza 
Ismael and Nazir Adam and llyas al Hamid and 
Syarifuddin won large majorities. 
Significance of the victory 
The significance of the electoral victory of the 
independent candidates should not be under-estimated. 
The defeat of the national parties shows that the 
Acehnese opted for political change and for a new 
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The December elections gave the Acehnese a real 
choice for the first time. As a result, their allegiance went 
in large part to GAM. The victory of the lrwandi-Nazar 
team can be seen as a victory for GAM or more generally 
as a victory for a change in the political landscape of 
Aceh. It can also be seen .that support for GAM far 
exceeds its membership. The official number of former 
GAM combatants is put at 3,000, while GAM membership 
is up to ten times as much. But the support GAM won in 
the elections, discounting the non-registered voters, was 
at least 25 times the size of the membership. Many 
observers were doubtful about the extent of the support 
for GAM, but the election results removed any 
uncertainty. 
The 30 years of war and conflict have substantially 
affected the political views and perceptions of the 
Acehnese. They have become more critical than voters 
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elsewhere in Indonesia and have also developed 
a strong desire for reform, self governance, and 
a say in running their own economy. The MoU 
provides all this and it was GAM that 
negotiated the agreement in Helsinki. As a 
result, the Acehnese showed gratitude by 
voting for the independent candidates. 
Consequences for other provinces 
Other provinces, in particular West Papua, 
which has also been granted special autonomy 
status, do not enjoy the chance of having 
independent candidates and local parties. 
Now that there has been a breakthrough in 
Aceh, it will be more difficult for the national 
parliament in Jakarta to insist that other 
provinces should not have the same option. 
First reactions in Jakarta were mixed, non-
committal and along the lines of wait-and-see. 
Nevertheless, apart from ultra nationalist voices 
within the PDl-P, there has been little in the 
way of anger or dismay. Vice-President Yusuf AMM decommissioning operation 
Kalla came to lrwandi's defence, saying he was 
confident that the new government in Aceh would 
establish relations with the centre, as other provinces have 
done. 
Press comments 
non-organic troops from Aceh. It also functioned as 
mediator between GAM and the Indonesian government 
and was able to respond swiftly whenever problems 
occurred. The AMM monitored the drafting and adoption 
of LOGA through the local and national parliaments. 
The AMM is regarded by peace and confl.ict resolution 
experts as a model for the management and resolution of 
conflicts elsewhere in the world. 
The press in Jakarta has generally welcomed the election 
of lrwandi and Nazar, commenting rather extensively on 
the defeat of the major Jakarta parties. An editorial in 
Media Indonesia bore the title: 'Aceh 
slaps the face of the political parties' The AMM is regarded by peace and conflict 
while Suara Pembaruan wrote an 
editorial on: 'The demise of the resolution experts as a model for the management 
supremacy of political parties' . They • • 
say it all. It is to be expected that the and resOIUtlOn Of COnfhCtS elsewhere 
national press will continue to focus 
on the performance of the Aceh 
leaders and their future relations with the government in 
Jakarta. 
General elections are due to be held in 2009 when the 
Acehnese will choose their representatives to the national 
parliament as well as voting for local assemblies. By that 
time, GAM and other groups will probably have already 
re-constituted themselves as local parties and be in an 
even better position to threaten the existence of the 
national parties. While it is too early to make predictions, 
it it not difficult to foresee that there could be more 
drastic changes in the political landscape. 
AMM, a success story 
The AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) was set up as the 
result of the MoU signed in Helsinki and came into being 
on 15 September 2005. It was set up by the European 
Union and ASEAN to monitor the peace agreement. Its 
initial mandate was extended several times and it 
completed its mission on 15 December 2006, four days 
after the local elections. 
In the sixteen months of its existence, there were no 
serious violations of the MoU, a reflection of the 
professionalism of the AMM staff as well as the political 
will of the Indonesian government and GAM to ensure 
that the peace process was a success. 
AMM undertook the decommissioning of GAM 
weapons and monitored the withdrawal of Indonesian 
4 
There were some weaknesses, however, such as a lack 
of contacts and coordination with the different groups in 
Acehnese civil society and poor coordination regarding the 
reintegration of GAM ex-combatants into society. 
The peace process and the democratisation of Aceh 
will need to continue. Other institutions will be needed to 
take over the work of the AMM. The peace process is 
not only a matter for the Acehnese and the Jakarta 
government. The international community also has a 
responsibility to sustain the commitment to peace in Aceh. 
TAPOL Bulletin 185/January 2007 
WEST PAPUA 
Renewed conflict in 
Punjak Jaya 
Disturbing re1>orts have emerged over the 
Christmas anCI New Year 1>eriod of a 
substantial deployment of troops and 
military operations in and around the town 
of Mulia in West Papua's central highland 
region of Puncak Jaya. The 01>erations are 
a response to flag-raisinf inciClents and the 
killing on 8 December o two army 
personnel blamed on the Free Papua 
Movement, OPM. Reports indicate that 
the conflict between the security forces 
and the OPM has forced many 11undreds of 
people to flee their homes leaving them 
vulnerable to hunger, illness and Cleath. 
Information is difficult to obtain from the area because of 
tight restrictions on access for journalists, human rights 
monitors and others. It is difficult to verify the number of 
persons affected, but church representatives have said 
that as many as 5300 people are at risk in the sub district 
of Varno. Food and medicine is urgently needed to 
Goliat Tabuni. It has been suggested that the two military 
personnel killed on 8 December - Kopassus special forces 
officer, Sertu Joko Susanto, and retired army officer, Tobias 
Sirken - were undertaking some form of negotiation with 
the Goliat Tabuni group with the intention of luring him 
into being captured and possibly killed. Tabuni was also a 
focus of the 2004/05 operations. 
It is not clear whether the Tabuni group played a part 
in the killing of the two soldiers, but doubt has been cast 
on the claim that the group was involved. Some local 
observers have expressed the view that the TNI 
orchestrated the killings to create a situation of tension 
and unrest that would make operations against the OPM 
and pro-independence supporters easier to undertake. 
The killings would also be used to justify the establishment 
of more local military commands and an increase in the 
number of troops in the central highlands where support 
for independence is at its strongest [4]. 
There is also speculation that the incident was set up 
to further the objectives of a secret intelligence operation, 
known as 'Operation to Handle Regional Conditions and 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe 
Similar military operations in the 
same area resulted in the 
displacement of several thousand 
villagers and dozens of deaths in 
2003 and 2004/05 [note 1]. 
communities are under threat from military 
operations, the influx of migrants, · economic 
marginalisation and the lack of government action 
Human rights not an issue 
Responding to the killing of the 
in health and education 
soldiers, the commander of the Indonesian military (TNI), 
Marshall Djoko Suyanto, said on 11 December that TNI 
actions would be informed by government policy and not 
human rights criteria. He complained that human rights 
were being used as a tool to criticise soldiers by people 
who resent the TNl's presence in Papua [2] . His 
statements would appear to give free rein to the troops in 
their behaviour towards the local population. 
The number of civilian casualties of the conflict 
involving the Indonesian military (TNI), para-military 
police (Brimob) and the OPM are not known. However, 
unconfirmed reports suggest that two more army 
personnel were killed on or about 26 December and that 
five Kopassus special forces officers and a Papuan civilian 
Gunir Murib were killed on 5 January. 
A local source has said that a Papuan woman, Melina 
Murib (aged 38), her daughter, Tanem Tabuni (aged 13), 
and son, Meliem Tabuni.(aged 8), drowned on 4 January 
when crossing a river to escape military and police gunfire 
[3]. 
The source also claimed that five women - Lerina 
Tobolom, Yosina Tabuni, Kelina Wenda, Delina Tabuni, 
Herlina Wenda - were raped by the TNI and that eight 
other persons were beaten and tortured.[3]. 
Tabuni OPM group the target of secret 
operations? 
The current conflict in Puncak Jaya may relate to efforts 
by the military to target the local OPM group led by 
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Develop a Communications Network' [5]. This was 
instigated in June 2000 by the Department of Internal 
Affairs in Jakarta to target the pro-independence 
movement in response to the outstanding successes of the 
movement in organising the Second Papuan Peoples' 
Congress and establishing the Papuan Presidium Council 
in May/June 2000. 
The same intelligence operation is thought to have 
motivated the killing of Papuan nationalist leader, Theys 
Eluay, in November 2001 [see separate article] and may 
have provided the incentive for a number of other 
incidents [6], including the Timka killings in August 2002 
[see separate article], the raid on an arms depot in 
Wamena in April 2003 that resulted in the deaths of two 
army personnel and more than a dozen civilians [7], the 
killing of Yustinus Murib and nine other men in November 
2003 [8], and the killing of Reverend Elisa Tabuni in 
August 2004 [1]. 
TAPOL urges dialogue 
There is a sense amongst the highland people that their 
communities are under threat from military operations, the 
steady influx of migrants from Indonesia, economic 
marginalisation and the lack of government action in key 
areas such as health and education. In their situation, 
flag-raising and support for independence are 
manifestations of their deep resentment at the way they 
are being treated. 
continued on page 16 
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Convidions fail to resolve 
Timika murder mystery 
Yet another high-profile trial in 
f,ndonesia has e1nded with serious 
questions about the credibility of 
the proceedings, the 
politicisation of the investigation, 
and the role of the military in 
influencing the outcome of the 
case. On 7 November 2006, 
Antonius Wamang, an alleged 
member of the Free Papua 
Movement, OPM, was sentenced 
to life im1>risonment by the 
Central Jakarta District Court for 
his part in the August 2002 
killing of two Americans and an 
Indonesian near the Freeport 
copper-and-gold mine in Timika. 
Six others were jailed for 
between 18 months and seven 
years. However, key questions 
remain about the long-suspected 
role of the Indonesian mihtary in 
the deadly attack. 
Antonius Wamang (1L) and other Papuan defendants listen to the 
judges during their trial at a central Jakarta court November 7, 
2006. REUTERS/Crack Palinggi 
Around midday on 31 August 2002 a convoy 
of vehicles transporting a group of teachers 
from Freeport's international school home from a picnic 
was ambushed and came under sustained firearms attack. 
Americans Rickey Lynn Spier and Leon Edwin Burgan and 
Indonesian Bambang Riswanto suffered fatal injuries [1]. 
The incident took place at a point known as Mile 63 on 
the 79-mile long road that connects the Freeport mining 
town of Tembagapura to the urban centre of Timika. The 
presence of the Freeport mine in the area means that 
security is high and there are numerous military 
checkpoints along the road. 
Wamang has admitted his role in 
The defendants refused to acknowledge the legitimacy 
of the proceedings against them. They declined to enter a 
proper defence and remained largely silent throughout, 
staging regular protests and walk-outs. Chief amongst 
their complaints was the decision to hold the trial in 
Jakarta instead of Timika where the crime occurred . The 
accused men claimed they were denied access to their 
lawyers and that the medical treatment of Hardi Tsugomol 
was inadequate. They were also incensed by the manner 
of their arrest, which involved them being delivered into 
... the site of the attack would have been impossible 
the attack, saying that he and his 
men intended to target Indonesian 
troops travelling along the road, but 
evidence suggests that security to reach without TNI co-operation 
forces personne:I may also have 
participated or at least may have known about Wamang's 
plans and provided him with the ammunition to carry 
them out. 
Two of the other accused, Agus Anggaibak (real name, 
Johni Kacamol) and Yulainus Deikme, were also part of 
Wamang's group and were sentenced to seven years' 
imprisonment. The other four, Hardi Tsugumol, Reverend 
Ishak Onawame and two of his church workers, Esau 
Onawame and Yarius Kiwak, received jail terms of 18 
months each for helping to plan the ambush. Tsugumol 
was seriously ill during the trial and died on 1 December 
2006. Rev. Onawame and his church workers have 
persistently claimed they were not involved in the crime. 
It appears their confessions were obtained under 
questionable circumstances. 
6 
the custody of the Indonesian security forces by two FBI 
agents who misled them into believing that they were 
being taken for trial in the US (where Wamang had been 
indicted by the Department of Justice in June 2004). 
The men who were tried were among a group of 
twe1lve Papuans enticed by the FBI to visit a hotel in 
Timika on 11 January 2006. After being told to get into a 
truck to go to Timika airport, they were taken to a local 
police station where Indonesian troops and Brimob police 
special forces were waiting. Four of the men were later 
released; the others were taken to Jayapura and then on 
to Jakarta. 
The case attracted intense publicity and became highly 
political from an early stage because of its impact on 
relations - especially military ties - between Indonesia and 
the US. Despite initial resistance by the TNI, the FBI 
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became involved in the investigation and the eventual 
capture and prosecution of Wamang and his co-
defendants allowed Jakarta and Washington to normalise 
military relations. 
Did Wamang ad alone? 
In the immediate aftermath of the 
\VEST PAPUA 
forms had been US policy since the massacre of peaceful 
demonstrators at Santa Cruz cemetery in Timor-Leste in 
1991 . All military assistance to Indonesia was cut in 1999 
after the Indonesian military and its militias ravaged 
Timor-Leste in response to the UN-administered vote for 
independence . 
attack, various allegations and 
counter-allegations were made 
about the involvement of the OPM 
and the TNI. An investigation by 
the Indonesian police in Papua and 
the human rights organisation, 
ELSHAM, provided strong 
indications that Wamang and his 
group did not act alone. 
Eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence on the 
firearms used, and circumstantial evidence 
suggest that a second group of TNI gunmen may 
have been involved. 
From the beginning, questions 
were asked about the ability of the OPM to sustain an 
attack on the teachers' convoy for around 30 to 45 
minutes with the basic weaponry at their disposal. The 
investigations also pointed to the fact that the attackers 
were well-trained sharpshooters and that the site of the 
attack was tightly secured and would have been 
impossible to reach without TNI co-operation. Military 
personnel appeared on the scene only after the attack had 
ended despite it being close to a permanently-staffed 
security post. 
Eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence on the 
firearms used, and circumstantial evidence suggest that a 
second group of TNI gunmen may have been involved . 
The circumstantial evidence includes the intimidation of 
witnesses and ELSHAM workers, attacks on ELSHAM 
offices and staff; a legal action for defamation by the TN I 
against ELSHAM, the conduct of a sham reconstruction, 
and the doctoring of the crime scene by the TNI. All 
these matters are considered in detail in an important 
series of three articles entitled 'Murder at Mile 63' by 
Indonesian journalist, Andreas Harsono, and 
anthropologist and Papuan expert, S. Eben Kirksey, 
published by Joyo Indonesia News Service and the Pantau 
Foundation [2]. 
In interviews cited by Harsono and Kirksey, Wamang 
has provided a credible account of a trip to Jakarta to 
obtain bullets and weapons from police and military 
contacts although he claims that the guns were 
subsequently diverted to Aceh. This has given rise to 
speculation that the TNI used its prior knowledge of 
Wamang's plans to stage its own attack in order to 
discredit the OPM. In November 2002, the Washington 
Post reported that the ambush was discussed at the 
highest level of the military [3]. An additional or 
alternative motive may have been the TNl's desire to warn 
the Indonesian authorities and Freeport that the TNI 
should not be deprived of its lucrative security role at the 
Freeport mine. 
Despite being available to the prosecution, none of the 
evidence that suggests Wamang did not act alone was 
tested in court nor were the motives of other possible 
perpetrators. 
Indonesia-US military ties back to normal 
The Timika case became a major stumbling block to the 
resumption of full military relations between Indonesia 
and the US. This had been a particular priority for the US 
since 9/11 despite strong objections by the US Congress 
and human rights groups. Restrictions under various 
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In 2003 , Congress imposed a ban on a small but 
symbolically important programme known as International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) and foreign 
military financing of weapons sales until the State 
Department determined that the Indonesian government 
and military were co-operating with the FBI investigation 
into the Timika killings. However, the surprise indictment 
of Wamang in the US in June 2004 led to Secretary of 
State, Condoleezza Rice restoring IMET in February 2005. 
In November 2005, the Bush administration swept aside a 
bipartisan Congressional consensus and exploited a 
'national security waiver' to restore full military ties. In 
May 2006, the administration announced a new Pentagon 
programme that will provide up to $19 million in 
additional funds for building Indonesian military ·capacity 
[4] . 
Notes: 
1. See also earlier TAPOL Bulletin reports: No. 169/70, 
p.22; No 171/172, p. 18; No 174/174, p. ·12; No 175, p. 
20; No 176, p. 18; No 182, p. 7; No. 184, p. 10. 
2. Available at - www.tapol.org/reports/murder63.htm 
3. Indonesia Military Allegedly Talked of Targetting Mine, 
The Washington Post, 2 November 2002. 
4. On Indonesia-US military ties, see also TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 178, p. 14; No 181, p. 21 . 
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No human rifhts improvement 
under specia autonomy 
The human rights situation in West Papua 
has remained- dismal since the introduction 
of special autonom¥ in 2001. In a report 
summarising conditions in 2006, the 
Papuan human rights organisation, 
ELSHAM, lists a number of incidents th'at 
have resulted in atrocities and yet more 
suffering for the West Papuan people. 
Special Autonomy was introduced in 2001 as a special 
concession to Papuans who had been unlawfully 
integrated into the Indonesian Republic in 1969 by means 
of the Act of Free Choice when just over one thousand 
tribal leaders were corralled into voting unanimously to be 
part of Indonesia. They had no choice in the matter. 
The law was enacted as the result of a political 
decision by the Indonesian government after it had come 
under intense pressure from the Papuan people from 
1995-2000 over the question of a Free Papua. 
After the introduction of regional autonomy 
throughout Indonesia, Papuan leaders from the churches, 
local NGOs, academics and tribal 
human rights violations during the five years of special 
autonomy: 
Nineteen summary executions: Including Tolinawimban 
Gire, Yustinus Murib, Derek Murib, Pastor Elisa Tabuni, 
Moses Douw, Marinus Kogoya, Sodema Hubi, 
Mokanineak Kossy, Marius Marian, Yunus Giay. 
18 arbitrary arrests, 157 cases of mal-treatment and 
two forced disappearances. 
ELSHAM describes the many violations of human 
rights as tending towards a process of ethnic genocide (its 
point here, we believe, is to emphasise its general concern 
about what it sees as ,long-term threats to the survival of 
t~e Papuan people as a majority in their homeland rather 
than to assert a legal case for genocide). 
ELSHAM also highlights problems in other areas. 
Minimal attention has been paid to healthcare and the 
spread of HIV I AIDS has subjected the Papuans to a form 
of mental torture. The authorities have failed to produce 
accurate data about the people suffering from the disease, 
how they were identified and how they came to be 
infected. 
leaders came together to draft a law 
on special autonomy. This was 
welcomed at the time by the Jakarta 
government as a way to quell 
demands for independence that had 
The trillions of rupiahs derived from special 
autonomy, have brought little if any benefit to the 
found powerful expression after the Papuans 
downfall of the dictator, Suharto in 
May 1998. The Papuans took their mandate seriously and 
drafted a law that contained many positive features 
regarding the sharing of revenues and the right to 
consultation about major political decisions in the 
province. 
The OTSUS (Special Autonomy) law also provided for 
the creation of an all-Papuan people's assembly, the 
Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP), composed of church leaders, 
tribal leaders and women's representatives in equal 
numbers. This body would be consulted on major 
decisions such as, for example, the partition of the 
province of Papua. 
Prolonged conflicts 
However, as the years have passed, Jakarta has shown 
little intention of complying with the initial promises. In its 
end-of-year report, ELSHAM, the Institute for the Study 
and Advocacy of Human Rights, states that profoundly 
important problems relating to Papua's legal status, to 
history and politics have resulted in economic and social 
problems. The result has been prolonged conflicts 
between Papuan society and the Indonesian government, 
which persist to the present day. The failure to solve these 
problems by means of peaceful dialogue has led to 
casualties among the Papuans and on the Indonesian side 
as well. 
ELSHAM which has a track record of monitoring 
human rights abuses, provides examples of numerous 
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With regard to the economy, the markets and banks 
are controlled by immigrants from outside Papua while the 
regional government and local businesses have done 
nothing to empower local people. As a result, Papuans live 
in poverty in a land rich in natural resources. The trillions 
of rupiahs derived from special autonomy, have brought 
little if any benefit to the Papuans. 
In the field of education, expenditure has benefited 
officials and employees from Indonesia instead of the 
economically weak local population. The officials regard 
their tour of duty in Papua as a chance to obtain 
educational advancement and enrich themselves by 
embezzling people's money. 
Governmental organs are inaccessible to Papuans while 
nothing has been done by the Maje/is Rakyat Papua to 
protect human rights. The MRP has been unable to exert 
any authority because there is confusion about its powers 
in the absence of special regulations. 
Violations in 2006 
The report then gives examples of violations during 2006: 
On 6 and- 7 January, Antonius Wamang and others 
were arrested in Timika by the FBI in collaboration with 
the Indonesian police, Polri. Eight of the twelve men 
arrested were taken without lawyers to Jayapura and 
flown to Jakarta where they were detained and 
interrogated in violation of legitimate procedures. This was 
the result of a political bargain between the Indonesian 
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government and the US government, the price paid by 
Indonesia for the restoration of military ties with the US. 
On 7 November, Antonius Wanmang (39) was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Agus Anggaibak (real 
name: Johni Kacamol) and Yulianus Deikme were 
sentenced to seven years, Yairus Kiwak, Hardi Tsugumol, 
Rev. Ishak Onawame, and Esau Onawame were 
sentenced to one year and six months. Hardi Tsugumol 
(37) died in custody on 1 December 2006 [see separate 
article]. 
Several human rights NGOs such as the Jakarta-based 
PBHI, ELSHAM-Papua and church and student networks 
protested about these cases and provided legal counsel to 
the victims. 
The cases served the political interests of the 
government and its relationship with the Freeport copper-
and-gold company and helped restore US confidence. 
On 20 January, a Kostrad (strategic command) special 
team in Nabire shot dead Moses Douw(19) a school 
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(Again, ELSHAM's apparent purpose in referring to 
genocide is to make a point about OTSUS providing a 
cover for the continuation of government policies that 
pose a threat to the survival of the Papuan people as a 
majority in their homeland). 
ELSHAM calls for political will both from the provincial 
government and the MRP in pursuit of their mandates to 
alleviate the sufferings of the people that have occurred in 
the name of development. 
Finally, ELSHAM calls on the Indonesian Government, 
the TNl/Polri and civilian institutions to stop ignoring the 
human rights problems in Papua. Violations of human 
rights are continuing in complete disregard for the sense 
of justice of the Papuan people, it says. 
Serious health problems in Papua 
Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) has just completed the 
first phase of a measles campaign in the south of Papua. 
A total of 13 ,659 children between the ages of six months 
and 15 years were vaccinated. 
Violations are continuing in complete disregard for 
the sense of justice of the Papuan people 
In February, MSF started 
receiving reports of measles cases in 
Papua's southern Asmat region. 
When it was clear the disease was 
spreading, MSF, together with 
student in the village of Wagethe, sub-district Paniai. 
Three of his colleagues were injured by gunfire. The case 
remains unresolved to this day while the families of the 
victims are left with a sense of deep injustice. 
On 16 May, members of the police and Brimob shot 
dead two Papuans, Sodema Hubi (65) and Mokanineak 
Kossy (47) while two others, Marius Marian (28) and 
Yunus Giay (26) were injured. This incident occurred 
during a clash between members of Brimob and 
supporters of the former Wamena sub-district chief, Drs. 
David A. Hubi who was charged by Wamena court for the 
corruption of Rp.10 billion. 
On 16 March, there was a clash between police and 
students at Cenderawasih University in Abepura. Five 
members of the security forces were killed while several 
people on both sides were wounded . During a military 
operation following the incident, a student was killed 
while hundreds of students disappeared. They are thought 
to have fled to Papua New Guinea but nothing is known 
regarding their fate to this day. 
As a result of this incident, about twenty pupils and 
students were taken into custody by the police, tried, 
found guilty and given sentences ranging from seven to 
fifteen years imprisonment. 
ELSHAM's conclusions 
The OTSUS law has resulted in a transfer of power from 
the centre, creating new forms of corruption in the region, 
with no benefits for the native inhabitants. Far from 
working effectively to advance the living conditions of the 
Papuan people, OTSUS funds have been used by officials 
to accumulate personal wealth, which has bred jealousies. 
According to ELSHAM, OTSUS has sown the seeds of 
genocide in Papua rather than empowering the Papuan 
people and making them masters in their own homeland. 
The provincial government and multinational 
corporations, such as PT Freeport and the LNG project, 
have supported the process of genocide of the Papuans 
because of their failure to protect and empower the native 
inhabitants. 
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national and provincial health officials, launched a mass 
vaccination campaign covering four out of seven sub-
districts - a population of 43,904. 
This outbreak highlights the high burden of infectious 
disease in the province and the lack of health services 
resulting in poor routine vaccination. 
In March, MSF succeeded in vaccinating 80 per cent of 
the target population in an area where the previous 
vaccination level had been about 39 per cent. 
MSF also responded to a cholera outbreak in the 
highlands region of Wamena after sending an emergency 
team to investigate and set up a treatment centre to 
support Wamena General Hospital. The treatment centre 
was staffed by Indonesian and international medical staff. 
Papua's health status is the lowest in Indonesia. 
Limited access to health facilities, lack of health education 
and poor sanitation leave large parts of the population 
vulnerable to outbreaks of disease, according to MSF. 
"People are living in conditions that I did not think 
were possible in Indonesia, and are dying from simple, 
curable illnesses," said MSF Dr Kabul Priyantoro. "More 
needs to be done to ensure Papuans have better access to 
health care or we will continue to see epidemics· such as 
this. " 
He said that responding to emergencies in Papua is 
particularly challenging as the lack of infrastructure and 
· isolation of many communities places them out of the 
immediate reach of health facilities. 
"Papua is without a doubt one of the toughest places 
to provide emergency medical care in," said MSF Head of 
Mission, Wim Fransen. "Just reaching people is a battle in 
itself." Papua also has one of the highest incidences of 
malaria in Indonesia. 
Source: Jean-Pierre Amigo/MSF 
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West Papua debated in UK 
Parliament 
West Papua was the subject of a 
one-hour debate in the House of 
Lords on 8 January 2007. Seven 
members of the Lords spoke, 
making recommendations about 
what the British Government 
should do to promote the cause 
of the West Papuan people. One 
speaker quoted at lengtfl from a 
letter to the Indonesian 
ambassador written by a West 
Papuan leader in the UK. The 
Government had little to offer in 
response to the many suggestions 
made in the debate. 
Opening the debate was Lord Harries, 
formerly Bishop of Oxford, who has for years 
spoken out in support of the West Papuan 
people. He asked what representations the 
Government are making to further the 
independence of West Papua. He said that 
while West Papua may seem far away, to its 
people their problems are immediate and 
painful, and the principles are fundamental to 
civilised life in the modern world . The issue is 
whether a people have the right to self-
determination and, if so, how we ensure that 
they can freely choose to exercise that right. 
The West Papuans are a people, the same 
people as those of Papua New Guinea who 
obtained their independence from Britain over 
Continued protest in the UK, Indonesian Embassy, 1 December 
2006 
30 years ago. They have no desire to be ruled from 
Jakarta. As a Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefing 
in 1969, now publicly available, put it: 
'Privately .... we recognise that the people of West 
lrian (West Papua) have no desire to be ruled by the 
Indonesians', and that 'the process of consultation did 
not allow a genuinely free choice to be made'. 
That is putting it mildly, said the peer. The so-called 
Act of Free Choice consisted of 1,026 people being forced 
at gunpoint to vote for integration with Suharto's 
Indonesia, and this being taken as the voice of the people. 
In a historic statement to this House two years ago, 
Baroness Symons, who was then the Minister, 
acknowledged that 'there were 1,000 handpicked 
representatives and that they were largely coerced into 
declaring for inclusion in Indonesia' . 
After explaining that West Papua was being split into 
three provinces and that local autonomy had been 
introduced with little effect, Lord Harries said the question 
now is: what can be done to rectify an historical wrong. 
Present policy is leading to increasing unrest, human rights 
abuses and the build-up of military forces, a policy of 
divide and rule with an economic dimension when one 
province has the liquid gas. 
10 
Flawed Act should be re-run 
Commending Baroness Symons for having the honesty to 
admit in December 2004 that what happened in 1969 
was a travesty, he said the Government can only enhance 
their reputation by pursuing a steady and consistent 
policy. He urged the Government to support a UN-
sponsored re-run of the Act of Free Choice, this time as a 
genuine referendum, internationally monitored and giving 
the tribal peoples of West Papua the chance to choose 
freely between independence, free associ§ttion or 
continued integration with Indonesia. 
Human rights abuses 
He said the Government should make representations 
about human rights abuses documented by Amnesty 
International. In particular, Lord Harries referred to more 
than 100 political prisoners, including Filep Karma and 
Yusak Pakage, jailed for 15 and 10 years respectively for 
raising the West Papuan national flag on 1 December 
2004. The government should raise these cases and make 
it clear to Jakarta that not only must they be treated 
humanely, but their imprisonment is totally unacceptable 
in a democratic society. 
· There were also questions of freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly, freedom to form political parties, 
freedom of access for journalists and NCOs and the 
importance of achieving a genuine dialogue between the 
TAPOL Bulletin 185/January 2007 
Indonesian Government and the people in West Papua 
who wish to raise the issue of self-determination . 
Next, Lord Griffiths, Labour, spoke about the massive 
transmigration programme that brought 1.2 million people 
into West Papua of Javanese and Sumatran origin, nearly 
all of them Muslims, changing the nature of Papuan 
society and culture radically. After describing the Act of 
Free Choice as 'cynical and wrong', he called for the 
implementation of an ethical foreign policy towards 
Indonesia. 
Lord Archer, also Labour, spoke mostly about the right 
of self-determination. Although the Indonesian 
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browbeaten or bribed into approving them by 
acclamation . 
By the time of the 'vote ', the UN team had been 
whittled down to a mere 16 members at the insistence of 
the Indonesians. It would have been impossible for the 
team to fulfil its remit, even with full co-operation, in a 
territory the size of California with only the most primitive 
transport and communication systems. However, members 
of the team did not complain when no interpreters were 
provided or when they had to ask permission every time 
they wanted to move outside the capital. They failed to 
blow the whistle when they saw Indonesian soldiers and 
officials pouring into the territory in 
'while West Papua may seem far away, to its people far larger numbers than planned and 
their problems are immediate and painful' 
exerting heavy pressure on the 
Papuans to choose integration and 
give up the dream of self-
Government introduced the spedal autonomy law in 
2001 , there has been no autonomy, and the atrocities go 
on . The persecution, the murders and the incarcerations 
will continue for as long as the protest continues. He said 
any form of international action must be initiated by a 
national Government. 
Lord Judd, Labour, quoted 'a letter from Benny Wenda, 
chairman of the Koteka Tribal Assembly now living in the 
UK, to the Indonesian ambassador on 1 December 2006. 
He referred to the invasion of Papuan lands and the 
removal of people to make way for the exploitation of 
gold, copper, oil and timber reserves . Ruthless techniques 
were employed, such as bombing from helicopters. People 
were rendered homeless, raped and murdered; all this was 
part of what happened. 'We call our Land our Mother,' 
he said, 'because she gives us everything we need to live. 
(But) you sold our Mother to British, American and 
Australian companies like Rio Tinto and BP. You got rich 
whilst we West Papuans got poorer. ' 
Self-determination, a legal right 
Lord Avebury said that the UK Government does not 
support West Papua independence. 'We were 
accomplices in its unlawful annexation by Indonesia' he 
'Papua is the 
determination . 
That fraudulent process was endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly with the approval of the UK. The UK 
firmly supported the betrayal of the West Papuans, not on 
grounds of principle but in solidarity with the Dutch and 
to improve UK relations with the military dictator General 
Suharto, who had done a splendid job exterminating half 
a million communists and was therefore a man to be 
encouraged. 
Baroness Rawlings, a Conservative, asked the Minister 
to comment on reports that a force of between 2,000 and 
5,000 military and police mobile brigade personnel were 
undertaking an operation in the Punjaya (Puncak Jaya) 
region . 
Under special autonomy, a Papuan People's Council 
was formed providing for the redistribution of resource 
revenues. But she was frustrated by the continuing failure 
regarding implementation of special autonomy. She said 
she believed that full implementation would lay the 
groundwork for a long-term resolution to the growing 
crisis in West Papua and would offer stability for the 
province. She asked what steps the Government has taken 
to encourage the Indonesian Government to proceed with 
special autonomy, and wanted to know whether the Prime 
last blot on Indonesia's global said. Self-determination, while undoubtedly a legal right, is a 
matter of state practice in the 
absence of any rules, he asked how 
it should be enforced. 
reputation' - Foreign Office Minister 
Six years ago, a Government minister said, in response 
to a question about whether they considered that an 
independent audit of the UN's role should be 
commissioned, that she was satisfied that the study by the 
Institute of Netherlands History would serve that purpose. 
That report, by Professor Pieter Drooglever, was published 
in November 2005 and confirmed that the outcome was 
pre-determined by Suharto, who had issued instructions 
that nothing but a ruling. in favour of Indonesia would be 
acceptable. The UN observers were allowed to see as little 
as possible and were ejected from the territory 
immediately after the so-called vote. 
An agreement to conduct the Act of Free Choice 'in 
accordance with international practice' was violated by the 
UN which failed to organise a plebiscite and, instead, 
agreed that the decision as to the future status of West 
Papua would be made by an assembly, whose members 
would be indirectly elected by an undefined electorate. 
The Indonesians chose the 1,000-odd candidates, all of 
whom were elected unopposed, with the so-called 'voters' 
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Minister raised the issue during his visit to Indonesia last 
year. 
However, she qid not believe that meaningful dialogue 
with the Government of Indonesia can take place on the 
basis of calls for Papuan independence. Her party supports 
the UK Government in respecting the territorial integrity 
of Indonesia and is calling for an open, inclusive and frank 
discussion and the full implementation of special 
autonomy. Indonesia was dragging its feet and the 
Government should press harder to find, through 
dialogue, a peaceful, just and dignified resolution. 
Government has little to offer 
Replying for the Government, Baroness Royall said : 'We 
respect Indonesia's territorial integrity and have never 
supported Papuan independence.' 
Lord Harries had asked whether the Government 
would support a re-run of the Act of Free Choice. 
continued on page 13 
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Murder of Theys Eluay was well 
planned 
While killings in West Papua are a regular 
occurrence, some stand out as being 
politically motivated to decapitate the 
1ndeJ>endence movement. First there was 
Arnold Ap who was killed in 1984, then 
Tom Wanggai who died in mysterious 
circumstances in 1989, and tl1en in . 
November 2001, the assassination of 
tribal leader Theys Hiyo Eluay. His death 
is the subject of a book published last 
May_ by a prominent Papuan church 
leader. Former Indonesian president, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, says Theys should 
be declared a jnational 11ero'. 
The author of Pembunuhan Theys: Kematian HAM di 
Tanah Papua (The Murder of Theys: The Death of 
Human Rights in the Land of Papua) is the Reverend Dr 
Benny Giay, who lectures on theology at the Walter 
Post Theological College in Jayapura. The book was first 
published in October 2003. Within a week, it had been 
banned on the grounds that it 'would incite unrest in 
the community'. The ban, initially announced by the 
attorney-general, was reiterated by the military 
commander of West Papua. After the book was 
withdrawn from circulation, human rights organisations 
condemned it as a violation of freedom of expression. 
Under such circumstances, the author clearly knew 
the risks he personally was taking by going ahead with 
a second edition of the book. 
Theys Hiyo Eluay had become a highly respected 
Papuan leader and was elected to chair the Papuan 
Presidium Council at the Second People's Congress, 
held in Jayapura in June 2000. This · • • • 
was just two years after the downfall the cnme was planned and conceived 1n Jakarta, to 
of Suharto in May 1998. During his • • • 
term in office, President quell West Papuan aspirations for independence 
Abdurrahman Wahid several times 
expressed sympathy for the Papuan people's cause and 
made a large donation to help cover the costs of the 
Congress. 
Paving the way for murder 
Theys Hijo Eluay was murdered on 10 November 2001 on 
his way home from a Heroes Day celebration to which he 
had been invited by Lieut.Colonel Hartomo, the 
commander of the local unit of Kopassus, the special 
forces command of the Indonesian army. Hartomo had 
earlier visited the Papuan leader at his home in a show of 
friendship and presented him with a gift But visit to the 
Kopassus base was to have fatal consequences for Theys 
Eluay. 
On his way home, the car in which he was travelling 
was overtaken by a Kijang vehicle occupied by unknown 
persons. After the driver had been thrown out of the car, 
the Papuan leader was strangled to death . His abandoned 
car was not discovered until the following day with the 
dead man on the back seat. It was widely reported at the 
time that his driver had gone missing. After being forced 
12 
from the car, the driver, Aristoteles Masoka, thinking that 
his boss was on good terms with Kopassus, persuaded a 
passing vehicle to drive him back to the Kopassus base to 
report the abduction. However, this proved fatal as he 
disappeared and has never been heard of since. 
The new account of the assassination of Theys Eluay 
by Dr Benny Giay draws attention to three events which 
he says paved the way for the killing. The first was a 
highly secret document dated 9 June 2000 by the 
Director-General for National Unity and Community 
Guidance of the Department of Internal Affairs in Jakarta 
titled: Operation to Handle Conditions in the Region and 
Develop a Communications Network. This operation had 
been planned after the Department received a cable from 
the governor of West Papua warning that the aspirations 
of the Papuan people for independence had 'crystalised' 
at the Second People's Congress in 2000. The document 
listed the names of Papuans who should be targeted. 
Theys Hiyo Eluay was included as one of a group of tribal 
leaders, along with Tom Beanal, Agus Alua and the now 
deceased Yusuf Tanawani. 
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streets demanding that the police leave the Synod office 
so t hat they could use their place of worship properly. 
[Press Release by the West Papua Institute for Human 
Rights, 31 December 2006] 
The occupation of the Kingmi Church followed a 
public accusation earlier in the year accusing the Church 
in West Papua and international NGOs of promoting West 
The second move preparatory to the murder, according 
to Dr Giay, was the organisation of a Papuan Festival 
which took place from 1 - 16 November 2001 . A number 
of local churches were involved in organising the Festival 
along with the local administration; the army was charged 
with providing forty trucks to bring people to the Festival. 
Commenting on the churches' involvement, Dr Giay says 
that, in their eagerness to win 
converts, church leaders often fall 'He was a great man, a fighter, not only for his own 
prey to schemes devised by those in 
power, to the detriment of their people but for all of us' - Gus Dur 
congregations. 
The third factor was an atmosphere of panic created in 
Jayapura, following rumours about a 'Dracula figure' . Just 
prior to the assassination, there had been many Dracula 
reports in the press, which had spread like wildfire among 
the migrant communities. According to Dr Giay, the 
'Dracula Panic' lasted from 7-10 November 2001. It was 
claimed that a number of people had been attacked and 
bitten by the monster and had been taken to hospital. 
Fearing this alleged monster, many people were too 
scared to leave their homes amid warnings that no one 
should venture out on their own after dark. 
Dr Giay devotes several pages to what he describes as 
testimonies by witnesses, including reports that appeared 
in the local and national press in the weeks following the 
death of Theys. 
State held responsible for the murder 
Drawing his investigation together, Dr Giay concludes that 
the perpetrators of the politically-motivated assassination 
were members of Kopassus while the crime was planned 
and conceived in Jakarta, to quell West Papuan aspirations 
for independence. Jakarta's rol~ is evident, he argues from 
the fact that the perpetrators were tried in a military court 
and not before the human rights court. 
At the trial, one year later, seven Kopasus soldiers were 
charged not with murder but with 'maltreatment that 
resulted in the victim's death. The men were given 
sentences of between three and three-and-a-half years 
each . No one was ever charged in connection with the 
driver's disappearance. 
The trial of the Kopassus men was widely condemned 
at the time as a travesty of justice. According to the 
indictment, Colonel Hartomo had realised that Theys was 
committed to West Papua's independence. The soldiers 
who accompanied him in the vehicle had allegedly tried to 
persuade him not to go ahead with the cause but he 
refused. He had allegedly screamed abuse at the soldiers, 
whereupon one of them clamped his hand over the 
victim's mouth three times, until he realised that They was 
dead. In other words they had been provoked by the 
Papuan leader's belligerence. The only witness who could 
have contradicted this account was his driver who has 
never been traced. 
[See TAPOL Bulletins Nos 168, 169/170 and 171/172, 
September 2002, January-February and June-July 2003.] 
Kingmi Church stormed 
On 30 December 2006, Kingmi Church with which Dr 
Giay is closely associated was stormed and occupied by 
Indonesian police officers. Two pastors in the church were 
injured in the attack. 
Dr Giay told the press after the attack that he regarded 
it 'as an attack on the institution of the Church itself' . As 
he was speaking, members of the church were out on the 
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Papuan independence. It is an accusation that is strongly 
denied by Dr Giay. 
A spokesman for the Institute of Papuan Advocacy 
and Human Rights (IPAHR), Jason Macleod, described the 
accusation as 'ominous '. The label OPM is used by the 
police to silence debate and stigmatise West Papuans in 
order to justify repressive security operations. 'Church 
leaders who speak out for peace and justice are regularly 
subject to surveillance and intimidation by the security 
forces,' he said. 
Theys is a 'national hero', says Gus Dur 
Former Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
speaking at the graveside of Theys Hiyo Eluay in Sentani, 
said that the Papuan leader, chairman of the Papuan 
Presidium Council, should be proclaimed a national hero. 
Gus Dur, as Wahid is popularly known, visited the grave 
on the fifth anniversary of the death of Theys. 
'He was a great man, a fighter, not only for his own 
people but for all of us,' he said . . 
On the same occasion, Gus Dur also laid the 
foundation stone nearby for a monument for democracy 
and human rights. [Kompas, 14 November 2006] 
continued from page 11 
Conceding that the Act was 'extremely flawed', she said 
the UK has no plans to support a review because it was a 
matter for The Netherlands and. the UN. The 2001 special 
autonomy 'law allows the establishment of a truth and 
reconciliation committee to look at the incorporation of 
Papua into Indonesia, which indicates that the Indonesian 
Government recognise the need to address the long-
standing problems in Papua. She claimed that the human 
rights situation in Papua is improving. 'There is little 
credible information to suggest that major systematic 
abuses of human rights are currently taking place.' The 
major concerns are chronic low~level harassment, 
violations of freedom of expression and association, and 
social and economic rights. 
Baroness Royall accepted that Papua is in many ways 
the last blot on Indonesia's global reputation. The UK 
Government believe thatthe best way forward is through 
peaceful dialogue between representatives of the Papuan 
people and the Indonesian Government and the 
implementation of special autonomy. We will do all we 
can to support that process, she said in conclusion. 
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Indonesia-Australia security 
pact doomed to fail 
In their rush to repair yet another 
downturn in the their uneasy relationship, 
the gove,rnme1nts of Indonesia and 
Australia have signed an j Agreement on 
the Framework r-or Security Co-01>eration'. 
The accord is high on rhetoric and low on 
substance. One of its main purposes is to 
prevent support for West Papuan 
independence in Australia, but it is so full 
of inconsistencies, and meaningless 
J>hrases that it is more likely to exacerbate 
than prevent future crises between Jakarta 
and Canberra. 
The latest in a series of diplomatic rifts between the two 
countries occurred when Australian immigration 
authorities granted temporary protection visas to 42 West 
constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or 
territorial integrity of the other Party, including by those . 
who seek to use its territory for encouraging or 
committing such activities, including separatism, in the 
territory of the other Party.' 
The two countries also agree to be guided by the 
principle of 'Mutual respect and support for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and political 
independence of each other, and also non-interference in 
the internal affairs of one another'. 
Significantly, the Agreement does not even pay lip 
service to human rights (they are not mentioned 
throughout its eight pages) let alone attempt to address 
the human rights aspects of security co-operation in a 
meaningful way. It fails to account for the fact that 
human rights violations are a major source of instability 
and motivation for separatist activities in Indonesia. 
A Newspoll of 1200 Australians 
conducted before the treaty was 
the TNI is the entity that poses the gravest threat to signed found that 64 per cent of 
Indonesia's stability 
Papuan asylum seekers in March last year (protection was 
granted to a 43rd person on appeal later in the year). 
Indonesia immediately withdrew its Ambassador to 
Australia and set about persuading Australia to tighten its 
border protection and its system for assessing asylum 
claims [1] . 
Further tensions were caused in December, after the 
signing of the agreement, when the Indonesian Supreme 
Court overturned Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir's 
conviction for conspiracy in relation to the 2002 Bali 
bombings which killed 88 Australians . 
A new security treaty was first proposed by President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2005, but the spat over the 
asylum seekers provided the impetus for the Agreement 
to be concluded. It was signed on the Indonesian island 
of Lombok on 13 November 2006 [2]. 
The previous se(:urity treaty, signed in 1995, was torn 
up by Indonesia in response to 
respondents said the Agreement 
should include a clause 
guaranteeing free access to areas of 
Indonesia, including West Papua; 72 
per cent supported a guarantee of free access for human 
rights monitors to the province [3]. 
The Australian Federal Parliament's Treaties Committee 
is now inquiring into the treaty and will report to 
Parliament by June. 
Key provisions unenforceable 
The word 'separatism' is not defined in the Agreement. It 
could therefore be argued that support for West Papuan 
self-determination, as opposed to independence, is 
permissible. The Australian Green Party has vowed to 
continue supporting self-determination [4]. 
In any event, the Agreement specifically states that it 
does not affect the existing rights and obligations of either 
country under international law. On that basis, Australia 
would be obliged to allow West Papuan activists to 
express their support for independence in accordance with 
Australia's involvement in the 
international intervention in limor-
Leste following its 1999 vote for 
independence. 
'the Agreement does not even pay lip service to 
human rights' 
The latest Agreement sets out a 
framework for co-operation on defence (including military 
education and training, joint exercises, study visits and 
exchanges), law enforcement, counter-terrorism, 
intelligence, maritime security, and preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
West Papuan adivists targeted 
However, one of its most significant and substantive 
provisions (Article 2), in a clear reference to West Papua, 
states that: 
'The parties ... shall not in any manner support or 
participate in activities by any person or entity which 
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the internationally-recognised right to freedom of 
expression . 
The lack of clarity and contradictions in these key 
provisions effectively mean they are unenforceable and 
not worth the paper they are written on . 
Paradoxically, it could also be argued that the 
Agreement breaches its own terms since security co-
operation involves support for the Indonesian military, TNI 
(including the notorious Kopassus special forces), which -
because of its willingness to use excessive force and 
continued on page 16 
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JUSTICE 
Truth and reconciliation put on 
hold 
Indonesia's Constitutional Court has ruled 
that a 2004 law establishing a Truth and 
Reconci'liation Commission (TRC) is 
unconstitutional because it empowers the 
President to grant amnesty to perpetrators 
of gross violations of human rights. The 
Commission now has no legal basis and 
cannot be set up until new legislation is 
passed. The ruling to strike cfown the 
offending amnesty provisions, announced 
on 7 December 2006, has been welcomed, 
but there is disaepointment that the law 
was annulled in its entirety, leavin' the 
victims of Suharto-era atrocities without 
an important means of restitution and 
redress. 
Establishing the truth about past human rights abuses, 
securing accountability for gross 
27 /2004 [See 'The continuing search for truth and 
justice', TAPOL Bulletin No 177, p.10) . 
It was hoped that one of the Commission 's first tasks 
would be to expose the truth about the one of the last 
century's most heinous crimes, the slaughter of hundreds 
of thousands of Communists and left-wing suspects 
following Suhart's rise to power in 1965/66. 
However, the Commission was never actually set up by 
the current administration, giving rise to suspicion that it 
was opposed by President Yudhoyono, a former military 
officer, and elements in the government. 
As soon as it was passed the TRC law was criticised 
because it 'leans too heavily towards the possibility of 
pardoning past perpetrators of human rights violations, 
and not enough toward rehabilitating and compensating 
their victims' [Towards reconciliation, Jakarta Post 
editorial, 8 September 2004). The amnesty provisions in 
the law were regarded as contrary to international 
violations, and facilitating 
reconciliation between victims and 
perpetrators are key prerequisites to 
further progress in Indonesia's 
transition to democracy. 
The current lack of progress in 
these areas is a sign that the 
transition still has a long way to go 
notwithstanding the success of the 
Indonesia's commitment to the rule of law 
continues to be undermined by its failure to 
address the many crimes against humanity 
perpetrated during Suharto's New Order regime. 
2004 legislative and presidential elections, the Aceh peace 
process, and the recent local elections in Aceh . 
Indonesia's commitment to the rule of law continues 
to be undermined by its failure to address the many 
crimes against humanity perpetrated during the 32 years 
of Suharto's New Order regime. 
New political and legal initiatives are now needed from 
both civil society and the government to ensure that past 
and future needs for truth and justice are properly 
addressed. 
The demise of the TRC poses particular questions for 
transitional justice in Aceh. The August 2005 peace 
agreement between the government of Indonesia and the 
Free Aceh Movement, GAM, provided for a TRC to be 
established for Aceh by the Indonesian TRC, but that 
cannot now happen. 
Troubled history 
The problems of the transitional justice process are evident 
from the troubled history of the TRC. The idea of a TRC 
was first proposed by the administration of former 
President Wahid (1999-2001 ). Provision for the 
establishment of a TRC was made in Law 26/2000 on 
Human Rights Courts, the law under which the ad hoc 
court for East Timor was established . The law stated that 
the 'resolution of gross violations of human rights 
occurring prior to the coming into force of this Act may be 
undertaken by a Truth and Reconciliation Commission'. 
The TRC was then neglected until the end of the 
Megawati Sukarnoputri presidency (2001-2004), when it 
was formally established in September 2004, by law 
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standards which reject the possibility of amnesty for gross 
violations of human rights. 
Civil society ambivalent 
The complexities of the issue were underlined by the fact 
that different opinions emerged amongst Indonesian civil 
society groups as to whether the law provided a means of 
resolving past abuses. One group held the view that it 
did offer the prospect of realistic solutions and should be 
supported, while a second group argued that it failed to 
promote human rights and undermined the search for 
justice. 
Eventually the two groups reached an accommodation 
by forming an Advocacy Team for Truth and Justice (Tim 
Advokasi Kebernaran dan Keadilan), which decided to test 
the law by filing the case at the Constitutional Court. The 
team included organisations such as Elsam, Kontras, 
lmparsia/, LBH Jakarta, and SNB (Solidaritas Nusa 
Bangsa) . 
The Court considered a number of Articles in the law 
and eventually decided that Article 27 violated the 
Indonesian Constitution because it provided that 
compensation or rehabilitation for victims could be 
ordered only if the perpetrator was granted amnesty. It 
further ruled that, as Article 27 was key to the whole law, 
the law in its entirety had to be annulled. The Court also 
concluded that by treating perpetrators more favourably 
than victims, the law offended the human rights 
provisions in Article 28 of the Constitution that require 
non-discrimination and equality of treatment before the 
law. 
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The Court was not expected to go as far as ordering 
this ultimate sanction of annulment and rights groups are 
disappointed that they are back to square one in their 
campaign for t ruth, justice and redress for the victims. 
However, it is also felt by some that they have been 
presented with an opportunity to help develop an 
improved law that will secure victims' rights and comply 
with international human rights standards. 
Little progress on Suharto-era crimes 
Meanwhile, little progress has been made in investigating 
and prosecuting those responsible for Suharto-era 
atrocities. In November, the Indonesian House of 
Representatives demanded that the government act upon 
findings of the National Commission on Human Rights 
(Komnas HAM) on the forced disappearance of 13 pro-
democracy activists prior to the fall of Suharto in 1998. 
The House was critical of the Attorney-General's failure to 
follow up on the Komnas HAM report. 
Komnas HAM has itself complained that its work is 
being obstructed and under-funded; it has pointed to the 
fact that a number of cases it has investigated (including 
the Trisakti and Semanggi I and II shooting of students in 
1998 and 1999; the May 1998 riots that accompanied 
Suharto's fall from power; and the Wasior and Wamena 
killings in West Papua) have been halted or become 
dormant since being passed to the Attorney-General's 
office. 
continued from page 14 
reluctance to submit to civilian control - is the entity that 
poses the gravest threat to Indonesia's stability. 
Given its enthusiasm for non -interference, it is ironic 
that the most recent violation of that principle was 
committed by Indonesia when it blatantly attempted to 
influence the outcome of the West Papuan asylum claims, 
a matter entirely within Australia's jurisdiction . 
It would be illuminating to speculate on what might 
happen if another West Papuan asylum claim were to be 
made in Australia. Each party would interpret the treaty 
to suit its own purposes: Indonesia would demand the 
return of the asylum seekers and Australia would plead its 
obligations under domestic and international law. In fact, 
noth ing would have changed . The end result would be 
stalemate and another downturn in the relationship 
between the two countries . 
Hugh White, professor at the Australian National 
University in Canberra, has said of the Agreement: ' It will 
raise unrealistic expectation which will lead to bitter 
disappointments, making the relationship more, not less, 
vu lnerable to shocks and crises. Without deeper work on 
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T APOL has issued a statement [9] and written a letter 
to the UK Foreign Office expressing concern about the 
military operations in Puncak Jaya and urging dialogue 
between the Government of Indonesia and West Papuan 
representatives as the best way to respond to the 
growing tensions. 
It has also called for an ambassadorial-level EU 
delegation from Jakarta to visit the Mulia area and 
publicly report on the situation there. It has urged the 
Indonesian government to cease military operations in 
Puncak Jaya, withdraw its troops, and allow free and 
unfettered access to the area by diplomats, journalists, 
human rights monitors and humanitarian workers . 
Notes: 
1. See TAPOL Bulletin No 178, p. 23. 
2. 'TNI Commander Asks OPM to Surrender' , Tempo 
Interactive, 12 December 2006. 
3. Latest news from Puncak Jaya 11.1.07, Free West 
Papua Campaign , UK. _ 
4. See special report on the 8 December incident by 
Socratez Sofyan Yoman, President of the Fellowship of 
West Papuan Baptist Churches, 4 January 2007, available 
at https://lists.riseup.net/www/arc/reg.westpapua/2007-
01 /msg00012.html. 
5. See special report, ibid . Details of the special operation 
are available at 
http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st011012wpsecret.htm 
6. See special report by Socratez Yoman, op. cit. note 4. 
7. See TAPOL Bulletin No 171/72, p. 18. 
8. See TAPOL Bulletin No 173, p. 11 . 
9. See http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st061229.htm 
the fundamentals of the relationship from both sides, 
agreements like the one signed in November are worse 
than useless.' [5] 
A period of reflection, a determination to spurn knee-
jerk responses, and a commitment to promote peace, 
human rights and democracy in West Papua and 
elsewhere would be much more beneficial to the long-
term security interests of the two countries. 
Notes: 
1. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 182, p. 4; No. 183, p.11 . 
2. The text of the Agreement is available at: 
http:/ /www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/indonesia/ind-aus-
sec06.html 
3. Poll demands human rights clauses in Indonesia Treaty, 
Newspoll media release, 8 November 2006. 
4. Greens ignore security treaty to celebrate West Papuan 
Day, Green Party media release, 1 December 2006. 
5. The Lombok Pact's Empty Promise, Far Eastern 
Economic Review, December 2006. 
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TIM OR-LESTE 
Chega! launched at 
Westminster 
Chega!, the highly-praised report of 
Timor-Leste's Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR) was launched in the UK 
Parliament on 28 Novembe,r at an 
event sponsored by TAPOL, the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group 
(PHRG), Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch and Progressio. Timor-
Leste's Prime Minister, Jose Ramos-
Horta, provided a keynote message of 
support. Chega! is now being 
disseminated throughout Timor-Leste, 
but implementation of the report 
awaits consideration of its findings by 
Timor-Leste's national parliament. 
The main purposes of the launch, timed to coincide 
with a similar event in Canberra, were to raise 
awareness of Chega! and to urge UK 
parliamentarians to: 
• insist that impunity is not tolerated and press 
for the implementation of relevant 
recommendations on justice made by the CAVR 
and UN-appointed Commission of Experts [see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 184, p. 14); 
• encourage their counterparts in the Timor-
Leste Parliament to consider the report and to 
facilitate the implementation of relevant 
recommendations; 
• press the UK government, as a major funder 
of the CAVR, to formally respond to Chega!, 
particularly to the recommendations addressed to 
the UK, and to propose that Chega! be 
considered by the UN Security Council. Chega! launch at UK parliament, Westminster. Photo -
Tapol 
The event was chaired by Ann Clwyd MP, the chair of 
the PHRG. It was attended by MPs, NGO representatives 
and the Foreign Office. 
Extracts from the documentary about the work of the 
CAVR and the history of the Timor-
emotional impact on anyone who go through that entire 
process that lasted several years or who dared to read the 
report and the conclusions and recommendations. 
' ... an extraordinary endeavour in terms of the 
workload, the magnitude of the task and its 
Leste conflict, Dalan ba Dame, were 
shown. The event was then 
addressed by former CAVR 
Commissioner, Father Jovita de 
Araujo, Timor-Leste's Ambassador to 
the European Union, Jose Amorim emotional impact' - Jose Ramos-Horta 
Dias and a representative of REDE 
Feto, Timor-Leste's women's 
national network, lvete de Oliveira. 
Message from Prime Minister Horta 
The following is an unedited transcript of a video message 
recorded by Prime Minster Jose Ramos-Horta for the UK 
and Australian launches of Chega!: 
'The CAVR process was an extraordinary endeavour 
both in terms of the workload, the magnitude of the task 
undertaken by the Commissioners, but also in terms of its 
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'It's a mind-boggling, heart-breaking, brings anger, 
tears to anyone who is familiar with the history of the 24 
years of occupation. 
'The recommendations are far-reaching. Some are do-
able by the government, others might not be within our 
possibilities to do it, but what I can say is that as prime 
minister of this country I will do my -best to co-operate, to 
assist, to support first in the dissemination of the report so 
that it becomes a learning process for all of us so that we 
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learn from the past, so that we don 't repeat the same 
errors that in part contributed to this tragedy, but also 
other more concrete recommendations contained in the 
report, recommendations the government as a whole, 
with the parliament and others we will endeavour to 
implement them . 
'We owe it to the people. We owe it to the victims. 
We owe it to the current generation and the future 
generation so that Timor-Leste can live in peace and in 
harmony.' · 
Father Jovito 
In his address, Father Jovito made the point that Chega! 
was not the end of the road and that it was important for 
all concerned to see the process through to the end. He 
also stressed the relevance of Chega! to the situation of 
unrest in Timor-Leste in 2006. People's exposure to 
violence and impunity had led to some of them becoming 
addicted to violence and being· easily traumatised, he said. 
The lessons of the report had to be learnt and acted 
upon so that Timor-Leste could become a stable, non-
violent country. He said that the report did not support 
the claim (made by some during last year's crisis) that 
some parts of Timor-Leste had suffered more than others 
under the Indonesian occupation. 
Father Jovito highlighted certain of Chega!'s 
recommendations, including the need for the report to be 
debated by the UN and for measures to be taken to 
ensure the professionalism and neutrality of the police and 
defence forces. The challenge now is to get Chega! acted 
upon. Financial assistance to the post-CAVR secretariat 
would be useful, he said. 
Chega! 
The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) 
least one family member. He said it was important for 
their brothers and sisters in Indonesia to learn about what 
their military had done to the Timorese. 
It was also important for the 
Timorese - including the 
in one village, virtually all the women had become government and the church - to 
widows 
lvete de Oliveira 
lvete de Oliveira said that Chega! had provided some 
hope for the women and children victims of the conflict. 
It told the truth about what had really happened to them, 
but brought back painful memories. 
She described in distressing detail how many children 
of rape victims didn't know their fathers; how there were 
instances of pregnant women being raped; how women 
were threatened that their children would be killed if they 
didn't submit to the soldiers' demands; how military 
equipment was used to facilitate rape; how crimes of 
sexual violence increased during major military operations; 
how women were made slaves of military officers; how 
one woman gave birth to five children each by different 
fathers; and how in one village, virtually all the women 
had become widows. 
Oliveira explained how the victims' suffering was 
magnified by the cultural difficulties in the way of 
rehabilitation . Victims were stigmatised and ostracised by 
their communities. They felt shame and humiliation in 
testifying to the CAVR. Now they want justice, to 
empower themselves and to be involved in nation-
building. 
Jose Amorim Dias 
In endorsing the statements of his prime minister, Jose 
Amorim Dias said Chega! reflected what each one of the 
Timorese had suffered in the past. Everyone had lost at 
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reflect on what had happened, 
correct their attitudes to the people, 
and work out what to do to help. 
The patriarchal nature of the society was one issue that 
needed to be addressed. 
Timor Parliament's role 
Chega! recommends that the National Parliament of 
Timor-Leste take primary responsibility for overseeing and 
monitoring the implementation of the report. Members 
of the international community, including the UK 
government and the United Nations, have demonstrated a 
reluctance to act on the report until the democratically-
elected representatives of the Timor-Leste people are 
known. 
The UK government has informed TAPOL that it will 
not respond - even to those recommendations that 
directly concern the UK - until the report has been 
considered by the National Parliament. In his recent 
report on justice and reconciliation in Timor-Leste [see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No. 184, ibid], the UN Secretary-General 
noted that Parliament had not yet started debate on the 
report. 
The PHRG and the NGO sponsors of the UK launch 
have agreed to lobby the Parliament on this important 
issue. The PHRG will also encourage the Parliament to 
join the International Parliamentary Union, IPU, which has 
a sub-committee on human rights and next meets in Bali 
in April 2007. 
continued on page 24 
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ECONOMY 
Economy blighted by poverty 
and corruption 
There are two sides to the Indonesian 
economy. In terms of key economic 
indicators, it is seen as stable and solid, 
but there is another, darker side. Recent 
figures indicate that at least half the 
population is living in poverty. To add to 
the problems, little progress has been 
made in dealing with the corruption that is 
blighting the economy. 
The standard economic indicators used by most 
economists would suggest that there is nothing to worry 
about. Foreign exchange reserves are reassuring, inflation 
has remained steady at around 5 per cent, the rupiah has 
enjoyed relative stability, interest rates have been falling 
and exports are booming. 
Corruption a 'heavy anchor' 
It was none other than Paul Wolfowitz, now head of the 
World Bank, who described corruption as the 'heavy 
anchor' holding back Indonesia. Wolfowitz is no stranger 
to Indonesia, having been the US ambassador for a period 
during the Suharto era. In those days, the World Bank 
refrained from mentioning the 'c' 
Another speaker, from the Catholic Council of Bishops, 
Father Benny Susetyo, said that corruption had become 
endemic in society while the political system made those 
in power more corrupt. In his words, corruption ' is caused 
by the massive concentration of power in decision-makers 
who do not have any direct responsibility to the people' . 
He even argued that Indonesians could commit corruption 
legally 'when the state makes legislation that 
accommodates the bribers'. [Jakarta Post, 16 December 
2006] 
According to Transparency lnternational 's annual 
reports on corruption, Indonesia was the sixth worst 
performer out of 163 countries in 2004. It improved 
slightly to seventh worst in 2005 
Major corruptors untouched 
Anti-graft activists are critical of the Yudhoyono 
government for failing to take action against major 
corruptors based in the State Palace during the Suharto 
era and against the military. Denny lndrayana, the 
chairman of Gadjah Mada University's anti-graft study 
centre said members of the Suharto family and the 
military were being ignored as well as a group of the 
word, but now Joel Hellman, who 
heads the World Bank's Indonesia· 
anti-corruption unit, concedes that 
the Bank must share the blame for 
ignoring the regime's excesses and 
Indonesia was the sixth most corrupt country out 
of 163 in 2004 
allowing billions of dollars to be siphoned off. 
Referring to a major project using $10 billion allocated 
to post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh, much of it funded 
by Australia, Hellman said: 'Now our projects have layer 
upon layer of safeguards to try and prevent bribery, and 
even still, we're constantly faced by the problem, and by 
no means have we solved it.'. 
He also said an internal investigation had found a large 
British consultancy firm (name not mentioned) that had 
greased the palms of numerous Indonesian officials. Under 
the Bank's anti-corruption guidelines, it wrote to the 
Indonesian government four months ago cancelling $10 
million allocated to three road projects and demanded that 
$6 million paid to the firm be re-funded, but the 
Government refused, and even blasted the Bank for 
making the matter public. But the chief executive of 
Indonesia's planning board, Bappenas, said it was a two-
way process, that there were irregularities in the awarding 
of the project, suggesting that World Bank personnel were 
involved. [Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 2006] 
Speaking at a seminar on Corruption and Culture last 
December, sponsored by the US embassy and the 
University of Atmajaya, Indonesian historian Anhar 
Gongong said that corruption was rooted in the country's 
culture and took various forms. A recent survey by 
Transparency International found that most Indonesians 
believe that the House of Representatives, the police and 
the judiciary are the most corrupt institutions in the 
country. 
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conglomerates accused of swindling massive funds from 
the Bank of Indonesia Liquidity Fund (BLBI) . 
The SBY government was criticised for only going after 
low-ranking or former officials in corruption cases, without 
ever touching the four targets. Efforts to start an 
investigation of the four targets fizzled out with little 
fanfare several years ago. 
The corruption allegations against the family of 
Soeharto have become a perennial headache for the 
Yudhoyono administration. 'The likelihood is that until the 
end of his term, Yudhoyono will do nothing against the 
Cendana (Suharto) family,' Denny said .. 
As for the military, which Denny said he suspected had 
a history of corruption cases involving arms purchases, it 
has never been investigated. [Jakarta Post, 15 January 
2007] 
Corruption Eradication Commission to be 
abolished 
In a surprise decision, the Constitutional Court announced 
in December that the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) would be abolished in three years time, along with 
the Corruption Court (Tipikor) . In response to the 
decision, Teten Masduki, head of Indonesia Corruption 
Watch, said that even though this would happen in three 
years' time, the Constitutional Court had 'scored a victory 
for corruptors'. He warmly praised the work of the 
Corruption Court which always came down against the 
corruptors and in cases where they needed to appeal 
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against a decision, they further strengthened their 
arguments. He warned that the three-year grace period 
cou ld be used by the Constitutional Court to intervene in 
pending cases such as the recent high-profile case of an 
alleged major corruptor Bagir Manan. Furthermore, as is 
well known , the Indonesian parliament is also very 
resistant to moves to combat corruption . [Suara 
Pembaruan , 21 December 2006] 
The scourge of poverty 
While most economic indicators suggest that the economy 
is doing well, commentators who look beyond these 
indicators, point to a very different reality. According to B. 
Herry-Priyono, writing in The Jakarta Post, the most 
important news came on 7 December 2006, with the 
release of a 350-page report by the World Bank revealing 
that 108.78 million Indonesians are living on less than $2 
a day, the equivalent of the cost of a cup of cappuccino in 
a modest cafe in Jakarta. Of these 108.78 million, 69 per 
cent live in rural areas and 64 per cent work in agriculture, 
75 per cent work in the informal sector while 55 per cent 
have less than a primary education . 
Some economists argue that with a booming corporate 
sector, the best way to deal with the poor would be to 
incorporate them as quickly as possible into the corporate 
sector. But according to Herry Priyono, this remedy would 
only entrap the poor into greater dependence. He turns 
instead to the ideas of Muhammad Yunus from 
minimise labour costs. This would free them from paying 
severance pay to dismissed workers and enable them to 
simplify recruitment of expatriates. 
The Minister for Manpower and Transmigration has 
reformed and simplified labour export procedures to make 
it possible for more Indonesian workers to be shipped 
abroad for jobs. In 2004 and 2005, around 450,000 
workers were sent abroad, of whom the vast majority are 
women . 
Attention was also drawn to the continuing 
transmigration programme to re-settle people from Java 
to the less populated outer islands. The government has 
been accused of being slow in resettling poor families and 
job seekers to the transmigration areas. As a result, the 
bulk of the resettled families have ended up in miserable 
conditions. The programme has also led to conflicts with 
the local people whose ancestral lands have been given to 
newcomers. More than 500 transmigrant families from 
Paso, East Timar and Ambon have left their homes in 
Talakar and Soroako, South Sulawesi, because of conflicts 
over land, while others left because the land was 
unproductive.[The Jakarta Post, 26 December 2006] 
Mud continues to flow in East Java 
The mudflow which has been inundating villages in East 
Java since last May, is still gushing, with no end in sight to 
-the disaster. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 184, October 2006] 
Latest figures suggest that as many as 24,000 people have 
been affected . To make matters 
at least half the population is living in poverty 
worse, a gas pipeline near the centre 
of the gushing hole exploded in 
November, killing 13 people. 
Bangadesh, winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize, who argues 
that far from formalising the informal sector, poor people 
should be helped with small amounts of capital and 
entrepreneurship on the basis of their own strengths, 
potentials and energies. [Jakarta Post, 30 December 2006] 
In an editorial on 20 December, The Jakarta Post 
argued that the $2 poverty line is meaningless, because 
'the dollar is not valued at its current exchange rate 
against the rupiah, but at the rupiah's purchasing power 
parity, which this year is set at about Rp 3,250 per 
American dollar. Hence, the poverty line ($2) amounts to 
daily spending of Rp 6,500 ($2) per person, which is 
certainly far from sufficient for fulfilling even the most 
basic needs for living in a large city like Jakarta.' 
Bullish sentiments on the Indonesian stock exchange 
mean nothing to these poor people none of whom own 
shares. What the government has failed miserably to do 
is to help deliver productive jobs that provide a living 
wage, wrote the Jakarta Post. 
According to official statistics, 11.6 million people are 
unemployed, which amounts to 11 per cent of the 
workforce, while the number of under-employed, that is 
people working less than 35 hours a week, amounts to a 
whopping 45 million. A recent labour surv.ey showed that 
60 per cent of the jobless are elementary or high school 
graduates and school dropouts aged between 18 and 35. 
These people are at the heart of prevailing social 
problems. 
Mass rall ies in many Indonesian towns held to mark 
May Day last year forced the government to drop its plan 
to review the labour law. The unions had rejected 
proposals by employers that they should be allowed to 
engage in outsourcing their core businesses so as to 
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The 'mud volcano' as it is now 
being called has been spewing up to 120,000 cubic 
metres of sludge from its core each day. Whole villages in 
East Java have been buried to their rooftops. The flow has 
covered more than 400 hectares and buried the homes of 
24,000 people, half of whom are still sheltering in a 
refugee camp. A toll road has been cut, 24 factories 
inundated, and the mud is now inching dangerously close 
to a railway line. [Daily Telegraph (Australia) 30 
December 2006] 
According to recent press reports, the authorities have 
now given up trying to stem the flow and have decided to 
try to re-direct the flow out to sea, in the Madura Strait. 
Meanwhile, estimated compensation payments continue 
to mount. The two companies involved, PT Lapindo 
Brantas, a subsidiary of PT Energy Mega Persada which is 
controlled by the family of Abdurizal Bakrie, the Minister 
for Social Affairs in the Yudhoyono government, and an 
Australian company, Santos. The Bakrie family is reputed 
to be one of Indonesia's wealthiest families. 
A dispute has been brewing about the cause of the 
disaster. Some say that it was caused by an earthquake in 
Yogjakarta which occurred just six hours before the flow 
started, while others argue that it was triggered by 
malpractice and failure to install proper casing on the well. 
The two companies at the centre of the disaster now 
face compensation payments by March this year of as 
much as $530 million to the affected villagers and to 
restore damaged roads, buildings, and factories. 
Since the tsunami in December 2004, Indonesia has 
suffered a stream of smaller disasters, while seismologists 
warn that more disasters are on the way for a country 
that is sitting on a 'Wall of Fire' . 
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Human rights briefs 
Adivists attacked 
On two occasions in December, gatherings of human 
rights activists were disrupted by paramilitary gangs and 
forced to disband. These unlawful attacks occurred in the 
presence of police who did nothing to protect the 
activists, in gross violation of the freedom of expression 
guaranteed under the Indonesian Constitution and by the 
International Convenant for Civil and Political Rights of 
which Indonesia is a signatory. 
A public event organised on 12 December by local 
human rights advocacy groups in Surabaya, East Java, to 
celebrate Human Rights Day was violently disrupted by 
unidentified members of the Anti-Communist Front (Front 
Anti-Komunis FU!). The event was being held to screen 
several political documentaries. One was a film made by 
Australian film-makers called 'Shadow Play' which focuses 
on the massacres that took place in many parts of 
Indonesia in 1965-66, when hundreds of thousands of 
people were killed . The other was 'Stage Limit' which is 
about the abductions of pro-democracy activists in 1997-
98. 
Shortly after noon, more than 100 members of the FUI 
gate-crashed the event with the clear intention of forcing 
those present to disperse. The disruptors demanded that 
the screening be halted as it would encourage 'communist 
ideology' and anti-Islamic sentiment in the public. They 
also threatened to kill those taking part. Fearful of their 
safety, the organisers abandoned the gathering. FUI 
members then seized all the documentary films, while 
police stood by without intervening. 
The other event took place on 14 December in 
Bandung, West Java. This was a public discussion on the 
issue of Marxist movements. It included a lecture by guest 
speaker, Marhaen Suprapto, and took place at the Ultimus 
book-shop in Bandung. This too was violently disrupted 
by members of the so-called Youth of Military Veterans 
(Pemuda Panca Marga - PPM) who barricaded the 
bookshop with a vehicle flying a PPM banner. Their 
followers entered the hall and disrupted the discussion, 
forcing those inside to disperse. As they tried to leave the 
building, they were severely set upon by PPM members. 
The guest speaker and two rather elderly people 
present at the lecture were taken to the police intel 
office and held overnight.. However, no action whatever 
was taken against the members of the paramilitary groups 
who had violated their right of assembly and freedom of 
expression. 
These two very serious incidents and the failure of the 
police to give these lawful events any protection represent 
a serious challenge to democratic processes and are clearly 
intended to incite actions against human rights groups, 
using anti-communist slogans. 
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Films about Aceh and 
East Timor banned 
In November the 
Indonesian Film 
Censorship Institute, 
LSF, prohibited the 
showing of three films 
about Timor-Leste and 
one about Aceh, at the 
8th International Film 
Festival in Jakarta in 
December. 
'The Black Road', 
about Aceh, is a 
documentary by the 
US journalist William 
Nessen who spent 
several months with 
the Free Aceh 
Movement, GAM, in 
2003. He was detained 
when he emerged from · 
his hideout and imprisoned for covering clashes between 
the army and GAM. The three banned films about Timor-
Leste are: 'Tales of Crocodiles' by a Dutch film-maker, 
'Passabe', by Singaporean James Leong, and 'Timor Loro 
Sae' by Brazilian film-maker, Lucelia Santos. 
The three films about Timor-Leste were also refused 
showings at the 2005 Festival. 
Reporters Without Borders, the worldwide press 
freedom organisation, strongly criticised the decision. 'The 
return of peace to Aceh and East Timor should allow a 
free and calm debate on the situation in these two 
regions,' it said in a statement. 'But the government 
continues to choose the outdated method of censorship, 
which is regrettable.' 
Insulting President no 
longer a crime 
The Constitutional Court issued a decision at the 
beginning of December scrapping three articles of the 
Indonesian Criminal Code which made it a crime to insult 
the head of state. The decision was taken in response to a 
submission by a lawyer who was acting for two men who 
were on trial for insulting President Yudhoyono. 
The decision was taken by a split decision of the Court 
with five judges in favour and four dissenting judges. 
The Criminal Code that is still being used in Indonesia 
was inherited from the Dutch era, and was frequently 
used during the regime of Suharto. 
Welcoming the decision, Human Rights Watch said 
that the government should immediately and 
unconditionally release all those currently in prison for 
charges under the articles that have now been struck 
down and should instruct prosecutors to drop all pending 
charges for peaceful political expression. 
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Fakhrur Rahman , 21, a student from Jakarta's Islamic 
University, is the latest person to have been convicted for 
insulting the president. He was sentenced to three months 
imprisonment. 
Police and prosecutor 
to appeal against 
Pollycarpus acquittal 
The Attorney-General and the poilice announced at the 
end of December that they would file for a review of the 
Supreme Court's decision to overturn the conviction of 
the pilot convicted of the murder of human rights activist 
Munir Said Thalib in September 2004. 
Pollycarpus, an off-duty pilot who persuaded Munir to 
shift to a business class seat on board Garuda flight 974, 
where he was given refreshments laced with arsenic, was 
sentenced to fourteen years for his part in the murder 
conspiracy. However, the verdict was quashed by a 
Labour updates 
UN expert calls for 
greater protedion of 
migrant vvorkers 
Following a visit to Indonesia from 12-21 December, 
the UN special rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants, Jorge Bustamante, urged the government to 
ensure that recruitment agencies protect the rights of their 
workers and end all illegal recruitment and exploitation 
[UN press release, 22 December 2006] . 
He was particularly concerned about reports of sexual, 
physical, and psychological abuse, long working hours, 
and irregular payment of salaries. 
Indonesia provides large numbers of migrant workers, 
mostly women, for overseas employees. 
Mr Bustamante called on NGOs and other socia,1 
actors such as the media, employers, police and 
immigration officials to remain vigilant and spare no 
efforts in protecting the rights of migrants living in 
Indonesia and the rights of Indonesians migrant workers 
abroad. 
The special rapporteur expressed concern that a 
Memorandum of Association between Indonesia and 
Malaysia addressed the interests of employers and 
recruitment agencies 'without equal consideration for the 
human rights of the migrants themselves' [see T APOL 
Bulletin, No. 183, p. 16]. 
He urged the Indonesian authorities to ensure that 
domestic law and its implementation complies with 
international obligations to protect the rights of women as 
defined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women to which Indonesia is a 
party. A forthcoming report by Amnesty International will 
highlight concerns about the treatment of domestic 
workers in Indonesia 
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decision of the Supreme Court last October, leav,ing him 
to serve a two-year sentence for falsificatior:i of 
documents. Pollycarpus was released. a .few days before 
the New Year after a three-month reduction in the two 
year sentence for falsification. . . . . · 
Attorney General Abdul Rahman Saleh could not say 
when he would submit the final appeal to overturn the 
Supreme Court's verdict but said: 'Big questions (about 
Pollycarpus) still remain . We will go after him.' He :said 
that the murder trial had revealed facts that linked 
Pollycarpus to Munir's death. 'Why .did he falsify the 
documents? Why did he call up Munir.'s wife (before 
boarding)? Why did he offer Munir to exchange their 
seats? Those questions are still ileft unanswered,' he said. 
Police chief General Sutanto said earlier that they 
would summon new witnesses in an effort to shed new 
l.ight on the murder of Munir in 2004. 'We are still looking 
for new testimonies from the old witnesses . and the new 
ones.' However, he declined to mention the names of the 
new witnesses nor say when any summons would be 
issued. [The Jakarta Post, 29 December 2006] 
The special rapporteur encouraged the Government to 
ratify the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families 
He will now provide the Government with ~.,;::·· 
recommendations on these issues in his report to the 
Geneva-based Human Rights Council. 
Musim Mas: Mixed 
nevvs on jailed union 
leaders 
Three of the six men jailed for their union activities at 
the giant Musim Mas oil palm plantation and processing 
plant in Riau province were granted remission of their 
sentences and released from prison as a gesture to mark 
the beginning of the Muslim festival of ldul Fitri on 24 
October 2006. 
The six men were arrested following a strike and 
demonstration at the plant in September 2005. The 
dispute arose over a question of union recognition and 
the implementation of minimum working standards. The 
men were charged in relation to damage caused to a 
factory gate and injuries to two company employees, 
although there is no evidence they were involved in any 
violence. 
The three remaining men, Robin Kimbi, Masri 
Sebayang and Sruhas Towo, are still in jail. They have 
been adopted as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty 
International, which is seeking their immediate release. 
See also TAPOL Bulletin No 182, p. 20 and No 183, 
p. 15. 
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Neles Tebay, Interfaith Endeavours for Peace in 
West Papua, Pontifical Mission Society, Aachen, 
Germany, 76 pages. . 
Clinton Ferna.ndes, Reluctant Indonesians: 
Australia, Indonesia and the Future of West 
Papua, Scribe Sho.rt Books, Melbourne, 138 
pages. 
There has been ,a welter qf ,books appearing in the past 
year or so about West Papua, a sign. that this issue is at 
last beginriing to get the attention that it deserves. The 
two books under review are particularly welcome in that 
· they are both of modest' length, concise in presentation 
and provide an excellent introduction for people seeking 
to understand an issue that has for far. too long been out 
·.of sight. If one considers that West Papua fell under 
Indonesian control more than forty.years ago, since when 
there have .been endless atrocities, massive violations of 
land rights 'and the u.nwelcome influx of tens of thousands 
of settlers from Indonesia, the publication of these two 
books is very welcome. University and public libraries 
should be encouraged to obtain copies as quickly as 
possible. 
The author of Interfaith· . 
Endeavours, Fr Neles Tebay, . · 
a Papuan priest who has .· · 
spent the past several years · 
studying in Rome, is a 
regular columnist in The 
Jakarta Post, Indonesia's · , ·. 
leading English daily. He is . 
a widely-acknowledged 
expert on the issues . 
confronting his people. He ·: · 
explains in the Introduction· 
that the leaders of all . -
faiths, Christianity (Catholic 
and Protestant), Islam, . 
...-.. 
Buddhism and Hinduism, ·took the initiative to campaign 
jointly for peace in 2000 when they began interfaith 
collaboration to work together for peace under the motto, 
'Land of Peace'. 
.The main aim, he writes, is .:to ensure that peace 
prevails in Papua, irrespective of whether it remains an 
Indonesian province or becomes an independent state'. In 
other words, campaigning for peace must be · 
acknowledged as being different from campaigning for · 
political independence. 
The well-argued pamphlet then proceeds to itemise 
the threats to peace in Papua, starting with a section 
titled: 'Military operations as the first resort'. Altogether 
twelve military operations are listed, starting with Operasi 
Sadar or Op,eration Consciousness in 1965 and ending 
with an operation in Puncak Jaya in 2004. 
But Papuans have suffered many other indignities such 
as the exploitation of their natural resources; massive 
human rights violations, the malfunctioning judicial 
system, the culture of impunity, the marginalisation of the 
Papuan people, and neglect of health care including the 
inadequate response to the spread of HIV I AIDS, and the 
lack of decent education. 
The central government is accused of leaving many 
issues unresolved, including the controversial 1969 Act of 
Free Choice. As for the law on special autonomy, the 
TAPOL Bulletin 185/January 2007 
BOOK REVIEvVS 
religious leaders say that it has 'failed to improve the 
plight of Papuan communities '. 
He draws attention to the composition of the 
population . In 1960, the population of 736,700 was 
entirely Papuan but forty-two years later, it is composed 
of 1.24 million Papuans and 1.14 million Indonesians. At 
this rate, within a few years, Indonesians will comprise the 
majority. All government and private offices are 
dominated by migrants, while Papuans lose out in 
competition in the markets. 
Because of the lack of health 
care facilities, many die of 
preventable diseases, while 
fifty per cent of children 
under five are malnourished . 
Packed with facts like 
this about the plight of the 
Papuan people, this short 
book is an indispensable 
read for activists and anyone 
wanting to know why 
Papuans are so unhappy 
about their present plight as 
Indonesian citizens. 
Reluctant Indonesians by 
Cl inton Fernandes is written 
primarily for an Australian audience and has no doubt 
already played a significant role in raising consciousness in 
that country about conditions in their neighbour to the 
north. 
Drawing attention to the hypocrisy of Australia's 
position towards Indonesia over the years, Fernandes 
argues that three mantras are used by Canberra to pacify 
the Australian public regarding Australia's close relations 
with Indonesia. The first is that it promotes Australia's 
national interest, but ties with Indonesia are mainly with 
the military who pose perhaps the greatest obstacle to 
Indonesia's democratic transition so, he asks, why a close 
relationship with the Indonesian military is in Australia's 
national interest. The second mantra is 'to stop meddling 
in Indonesia's affairs'. Yet, over the years, Australian 
governments have pursued policies which have been 
clearly interventionist. The third mantra is to 'prevent 
disintegration, fragmentation, instability'. One argument 
used by Prime Minister John Howard not to support West 
Papuan independence was that 'the last thing Australia 
would want is a fragmenting of Indonesia'. Yet, during the 
days of regional conflicts in the 1950s, Australia was very 
much in favour of the fragmentation of Indonesia. Indeed, 
the headquarters of the Australia Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade is named after R.G. Casey by the 
present Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in 1996. 
Casey was responsible for Australia's participation in a 
massive military operation to break Indonesia part. 
In a chapter called 'Meddling to Deadly Effect', the 
author points out that during the days of the army coup 
which brought Suharto to power in 1965, Radio Australia 
played an important role because of its high-signal 
strength and huge audience in Indonesia. The station was 
told to 'be on guard against giving information to the 
Indonesian people that would be withheld by the Army-
controlled internal media', The Australian ambassador in 
Jakarta worked to ensure that it gave 'prominent 
coverage' to reports of PKI involvement and Communist 
China complicity'. 
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The central chapters of the book provide a 
comprehensive account of West Papua's history from the 
Act of Free Choice in 1969, its experience as an 
Indonesian province and the contribution it makes to 
Indonesia's economic prosperity with its abundant natural 
resources. 
A chapter devoted to West Papua's fate after Suharto 
briefly runs through subsequent policies. Under President 
Habibie the first (and as yet only) dialogue with a Team-
of-100 was held. When the Team started off by saying 
that what Papuans want is independence, it left him in 
'stunned silence' and ended the talks. President 
Abdurrahman Wahid, adopted a much more sympathetic 
approach, changing the name lrian Jaya to Papua and 
making a generous donation to the June 2000 
musyawarah besar. He also consented to Papuans flying 
their flag as a 'cultural symbol'. 
But the Papuan Spring under Wahid soon came to an 
end with Wahid's replacement by Megawati in July 2001 . 
Four months later, the great Papuan leader, Theys Eluay 
was assassinated. The commander of the Indonesian 
army, General Ryamizard Ryacudu later described the 
convicted murderers as 'heroes because the person they 
killed was a rebel leader'. 
Special Autonomy is analysed as a betrayal of what 
had been promised to the Papuans. Partition was 
imposed under Megawati and cynically called 
'pemekaran' an Indonesian word that means 
'blossoming', which is nothing less than a euphemism for 
'divide and rule'. Although Special Autonomy permits the 
flying of the West Papua flag as a symbol of cultural 
identity, two Papuans who did so in 2004 are now 
serving long prison terms. 'As long as Special Autonomy 
means a Jakarta-imposed caricature,' he writes, 'rather 
than a genuinely democratic institution, Australian 
support will conceal more than it reveals'. 
In his final chapter which is modestly called 'A Way 
Forward', the author focuses in particular on 
empowerment of Papuans and the role of the military. As 
he points out, President Yudhoyono's policy of 
empowerment for the West Papuan people 'is certain to 
run afoul of the Indonesian military'. While we would 
argue that it is very difficult to make an accurate estimate 
of the number of troops now in West Papua, Fernandes 
quotes one estimate that puts the present military force in 
West Papua at 25,000. Given that the population of West 
Papua is now around 2.5 million (Papuans and Indonesian 
migrants), this means there is one security personnel for 
every one hundred people. This is higher that the ratio of 
coalition troops in Iraq. Indonesian soldiers enjoy impunity 
in West Papua (as indeed they do elsewhere in 
Indonesia), a situation confirmed all too accurately by the 
US State Department's March 2006 report which states 
that 'the Indonesian Armed Forces consider anyone killed 
by its forces in conflict areas to be an armed rebel. The 
government largely failed to hold soldiers and police 
accountable for such killings and other serious human 
rights abuses ... ' 
Reluctant Indonesians is a hard-hitting and well 
documented book which makes it is a very valuable 
addition to the growing volume of books now available 
about West Papua. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
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Passabe screening 
TAPOL and others also plan to organise a public screening 
in London of the acclaimed film, Passabe, which tells how 
victims and perpetrators in the village of Passabe, on the 
border of the Timor-Leste enclave of Oecusse and 
Indonesian West Timor, attempt to come to terms with 
their horrific past. Contact Tapol for details of the 
screening or copies of the film are available from -
www.passabe.com. 
Chega! is available online at www.cavr-timorleste.org. 
CD-Roms of the report and copies of the booklet, 
'lntroducing ... Chega/' are available from TAPOL. 
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